Polyamory: Internalities and Externalities

Note: since this is really a blog post and not an academic paper, I’m choosing to cite my sources by putting in links rather than having A Standard Format bibliography.

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This was originally a “response to bad takes on the internet” kind of post, specifically about the definition of polyamory from r/polyamory. I wanted to get this out on November 23^rd, which is apparently World Polyamory Day, but then I realised I hadn’t really done the topic justice and found interesting new sources, and so it got pushed back to now. While missing that opportune timing is unfortunate, I’m glad this has turned into something more than just internet drama.

Here are some definitions/descriptions of polyamory:

A) “Polyamory is openly, honestly, and consensually loving and being committed to more than one person.”— r/polyamory subreddit.

B) "the practice, state[,] or ability of having more than one sexual loving relationship at the same time, with the full knowledge and consent of all partners involved." – Zell Ravenheart (person who wrote the first article in which the word appeared, according to Wikipedia).

C) “Polyamory describes a form of relationship where it is possible, valid and worthwhile to maintain (usually long-term) intimate and sexual relationships with multiple partners simultaneously” – Poly/logue: A Critical Introduction to Polyamory.

D) “the practice of consensually and with mutual interest negotiating desire for more than one [loving] relationship” – Alexis Shotwell, ‘Ethical Polyamory, Responsibility, and Significant Otherness.’ [This is a great title].

Although getting at similar things these, are quite different and grounded in the description polyamory as actions/potential for actions. For instance, the r/polyamory description explicitly requires (active) commitment to more than one person, whereas the other definitions only require that this is a possibility. The Alexis Shotwell definition is the only one which references an internal state (desire) but still emphasises the action of "negotiating". That said, she also elaborates that she doesn't believe one stops being polyamorous just because they are not involved in a relationship. We can read "negotiating" as also allowing for self-negotiation in that case.

To turn these into identities we have to assume something like "A person can describe themselves as polyamorous if they engage in the activity of polyamory" in which the identity, under definitions A) and C), require external world activity. Conversely, definition B)  requires only the “ability” of having more than one “sexual loving” relationship but this can still be read to excludes those whose circumstances prevent them from establishing such relationships even though they want to (and includes those who could establish such relationships even if they didn’t want to). As for definition D), the presumed self-negotiation could be an internal activity.

The other thing that bothers me about most of these is the way they emphasise consent as if that’s not already implicit. This is the same reason I don’t like the term “ethically non-monogamous”. These definitions anticipate protests from people who believe “engaging in multiple romantic/sexual/intimate relationships” = “cheating” and in doing so center other's comfort and understanding. It’s a definition that doesn’t serve the people to which it applies. While I understand the practical reasons for such a definition (e.g., optics, gaining acceptance) it is still unsatisfactory. Particularly because polyamory is also not so fringe an idea as it once was. The sentences “Sarah is dating both June and Jack. She is …” is most naturally completed by the world “polyamorous”. Or maybe non-monogamous (but this feels much more clinical and, as an aside, still centers monogamy as the default). If someone finds themselves questioning whether they want to be intimately involved with multiple people, they’ll likely come across the word “polyamory” before anything else. Despite being particular it’s also the generic word one would use to describe being romantically involvement of multiple people even though this situation could work in very different ways.

This said, having read more of Alexis Shotwell's paper, I feel like her definition is by far the best of these. This is because her definition includes monogamy since monogamous relationships also requires negotiation over one's potential desire for other relationships and I find this encompassing very satisfying in some ways. That said, I would argue that a lot of the examples she uses as the example of questions that come up in these negotiations aren't really about desires for relationships. For instance hook-ups, thinking anime characters/celebrities during during sex, and watching porn aren't necessarily (or even usually [citation needed]) about a desires for a relationship (except under a very broad definition of relationship at which point the original definition becomes too fluid to be usable). Rather, they're often [citation needed] purely about the stimuli and one need not necessarily desire a relationship rather than just the fantasy of one.

Also, while I like that the definition D) includes monogamy, this also makes it ill-suited as an identity label. Indeed, if it is not distinct from monogamy, but rather encompasses it, then one cannot distinguish themselves meaningfully by claiming to be 'polyamorous'. This is not a criticism of this definition; I understand that it's a function of the definition in that it forces one to see relationships as a whole in a new light and I think that's valuable. But, similarly, it is also valuable to be able to identify oneself which also requires differentiation.

Anyway, the actual thing I want to talk about is the debate over whether polyamory should be considered akin the use "polyamory" as descriptive of what you do (external) vs what you feel (internal). It's used in both ways, and this inconsistency is seen both between individuals and within individuals (see this paper). The more common view (at least on Reddit) is that it should only be used as descriptive of what you do, e.g., “I am polyamorous” should only mean “I am actively participating in multiple romantic relationships”, but this sort of attitude is also quite evident in definitions A) - C) and, at least partially, D) too.

In Mia Mulder’s recent video about identity, one key point was that some people more or less consider all identities as “descriptive” rather than “aspirational”.  As another aside, this is the reason I use any pronouns: I feel like if someone does truly have a very narrow understanding of gender then, personally, I’d rather let them describe me in whatever words fit their own mental model. (However, I will find it very weird if their mental model amounts to undue concern over my genitalia and probably won’t interact with them much. And, of course, people should respect other’s choices for how they’d like to be described.)

In view of this, I don’t think it’s weird that some people take a hardline stance either way over whether one can use “polyamory” as descriptive of externalities vs internalities, but more so that it appears as if this applies specifically to polyamory compared to other possible identities. It’s not that they believe that all identities should be descriptive of one’s actions, but rather that polyamory is somehow special. As Meg Barker puts it, “The way in which people conduct their relationships (monogamous, polyamorous, or otherwise) seems to have a more complex relationship to self-identity [than sexual orientation does].” This is discussed by Christian Klesse here who argues against viewing polyamory as a sexual orientation. On a practical level he criticizes a biological essentialist view of sexual orientation, since (among other things) it offers limited practical benefits (citing, for instance, the difficulty in demonstrating persecution asylum seekers face when presenting a bisexual history). He also argues that the sexual orientation framework "arrests the multi-directional flows of desire" in that ascribes to a group people an unchangeable characteristic.  I’m inclined to, somewhat, agree; I’m not fond of the biological essentialism in general. That said, I don’t view sexual orientations this way in the first place and (although now I’m wondering if this is the ‘default’ way to view them and if I should abandon the concept entirely). However, that paper is based around political and legal frameworks for identification, rather than personal identification, which is what I’m focused on so it ma be the meaning shifts between these two modes of thoughts. In any case, let me clarify how I think about identification.

Words such as “bisexual” or “polyamorous” could (in principle) be used to describe not just “what you do” or “what you feel” but also “what you do (external world)” (e.g., engage romantically with multiple genders) or “what you do (internally)” (e.g., experience romantic attraction to multiple genders) or “who you are (self-identity)”. It seems that “bi”, and most orientation labels, are used in the latter two senses almost interchangeably (although I know of people who do not identify by the attraction they experience).  All identities possess this duality: there’s a base level descriptive meaning and an associated cultural context which coexist and inform each other. To further illustrate this point, consider how orientation identities are based around gender rather than any other characteristics like “tallness” or “musical ability.” It’s normal to say, “I’m straight/gay/ect.,” but it would be weird to say, “I’m musician-attracted” (even though musicians are typically quite attractive). This is because “musician-attracted” does not have enough cultural context communicate nearly as much orientation labels do. There’s a shared understanding of experience of having certain types of attraction and saying “I’m lesbian/bi/ect.,” suggests that maybe you share other characteristics with individuals who identify themselves similarly. It’s a showing of solidarity rather than functioning purely as descriptive.

To summarize, for me identities are words with both a foundational descriptive use and a cultural context which mutually inform each other. Although identification with sexual orientation labels has roots in biological essentialism, I think we’re at a point where these identifications can be used without any such assumptions about ‘innateness’.

Bearing in mind this framework: if it is reasonable to claim the bisexual identity because they experience attraction to multiple genders then is it also reasonable to claim the polyamorous identity if they experience a desire and willingness to have multiple romantic connections at the same time? I think it is. The external world alternative seems too restrictive, and it would difficult to delineate the boundaries in such a case. 

For each of the definitions A) - D) consider if a person could claim to be "polyamorous" if their dating interests and history were completely described by following situations.

a) You were in an (enjoyable and unregretted) polyamorous relationship but you’re now either dating at most one person. You may be open to polyamorous relationships in the future.
b) You're interested in dating more than one person, but are entirely unsuccessful.
c) You engage in romantic-seeming activities with several people, such as going on dates, and appear as if you practice polyamory but really all these acts are non-romantic for you. 

I suggest that the definitions give the answers as in Table 1. The r/polyamory definition A) requires external world activity and that the relationships are loving (i.e., romantic) so it's a no all around. The Zell Ravenheart definition B) requires that the relationships are loving but also that one has the ability to have more than one. The Poly/logue definition also requires possibility but does not specify that the relationships need to be romantic (only intimate and/or sexual). Finally D) allows for self-negotiation of desire for multiple (loving) relationships. I think it's only the last that aligns with my own sense of what counts as a polyamorous relationship and the reason it can do this is because it allows for qualification based on what is internal. 

           A            B            C            D

a          N            Y            Y            Y

b          N            N            N            Y


c          N            N            Y            N

Table 1

 As discussed, definition D) is too general to be used as a basis for identity, but it does highlight value of internality, and especially whether that internality should be internal activity (which is intentional) or internal desires (which are automatic). At this point I'll throw my own hat (definition) into the ring (list of definitions)

E) polyamory is state of desiring, and being willing to engage in, multiple simultaneous romantic relationships

I believe a definition grounded in internalities, such as D) or E), is best for the following reasons.

Consistency

Taking the word to describe internalities is that this is more consistent with how we generally view identities related to attraction. Granted, the sort of person you’re attracted to is a different thing to the sort of relationship style you’re willing to engage in, but these things are still within the realm of describing romantic interests. 

Kinship

By identifying with a word, it suggests not only that you have a shared experience with others but also that this experience is meaningful enough to you that you want others to know about it. It also suggests possible secondary characteristics you might want to align yourself with. That’s not to say everyone who identifies a particular way is the same but rather than you’ve seen enough people using with that identity that you’re willing to say “these are my people.” I believe merely having the desire to engage in multiple romantic relationships is a distinct enough experience that it’s worthwhile to identify with regardless of whether one is actively in such relationships.

Expanded Utility

While both polyamory (as identity related to externalities) and polyamory (identity related to internalities) promotes kinship based on shared experience, the latter is far more inclusive. Inclusivity alone isn’t enough, though, because if one were to be perfectly inclusive the word would be meaningless. However, I don’t see any drawbacks in this case; one is still able to focus in on more specific experiences related to what one has does externally after establishing a shared identity based on one’s internal experience. The orientation labels “gay”, “bi”, “straight” remain functional while being based on a description of one’s internal state.

All this said, these musings are somewhat inconsequential. I’m not really asking anyone to use the world polyamory differently. There may well be some utility for those who use it as an identity grounded in the description of external states which I’m unaware of precisely because it’s a much more internal thing for myself. Moreover, as mentioned at the start, the term has historically not served the people who it describes, and based on my experiences online, it seems to retain that legacy. Consequently, I don’t really want to apply it to myself.

Ultimately, my issue with the definition of polyamory isn’t really about the word, but rather about a lack of community to identify with based on my own experiences regarding non-monogamy more generally. Since as far back as I can recall having romantic desires, I’ve also found myself attracted to the idea of being romantically involved with more multiple people. The exception to this is that, between the ages of about 14 – 20, extreme possessiveness and jealousy somewhat repressed those desires. However, I got over that and almost immediately felt again a powerful desire to seek out multiple romantic relationships. This desire hasn’t gone away since then. This experience, and the feelings that resurfaced following, is integral to who I am. I’m proud of the fact I don’t get very jealous, especially since I used to, and of the fact that when I do, I’m able to deal with it well. I take great pleasure in even one-sided crushes, and I want people to be aware that I crush on others easily, especially if I have a crush on them. I enjoy being thought of as a very amorous person. I consider my encouragement of romantic and sexual freedom as one of the main benefits of being in a relationship with me. Non-monogamy is a core part of my identity, but I’ve so far failed to find any sort of community with whom I can feel a true kinship.  

A bit of a sad note to end on, I suppose, so let me emphasise some optimistic points: although I haven't found kinship with groups, I do have polyamorous friends with whom I have at least related somewhat (although I have no idea what they think of this particular topic). Also, I am satisfied that I understand  my own romantic desires in great detail, and the lack of people who get them exactly is also a reflection of that fact. Is there a name for that phenomenon, where the better one understands oneself, the less they feel understood by others?

Other updates:

I will eventually write a part 2 to the previous post about immortality.

I finished writing the new Act 1 for Solipsism=0+. Editing the rest should be a much quicker process.

There are a few updates (aesthetic changes mainly) which are upcoming to FdotG. 

I've been reading a webcomic called BreadAVOTA. I read a good chunk of it years ago, but I 'get' it a lot more this time around I'll say more about that soon too (possibly on the website itself).

I've been really enjoying a manga called After God which has narrative density like I've never seen in a manga before. 

An Immoralist Apology, Part 1: Why do you want to die?

Introduction

I strongly believe that

(P1) "Some people would enjoy eternal health more than a finite health," 

and 

(P2) "It is at least, morally neutral to accept eternal health,"

where 'eternal health' I mean either agelessness or true immortality. While I believe that stopping aging is in principle possible (although, sadly, we are not very close to this reality) I can't really imagine how one could be truly invulnerable to damage. That places this discussion very much on hypothetical grounds, but I still think it's a discussion worth having.

I think that (P1) - (P2) are perhaps the most easily defensible positions ever. Essentially they are the same as saying

"Some people would enjoy continuing to breath and it is, at least, morally neutral for them to do so." 

If you're now aware of your own breathing, apologies.

There are many common objections to (P1) - (P2)  and I will give my answers to them, but those answers will be brief and are included only for the sake of completeness. This is because I doubt there is any benefit to looking at this as an issue which could be resolved through reasoning . The 'debate' about the desirability of immortality, about whether mortality or immortality is 'better', has gone on for a very long time and you'll find staunch defenders of either side both among professional philosophers and your neighbors. See, for instance, the classic essay by Williams (1973) (which argues immortality should be universally undesirable because an immortal life would be meaninglessness) and its numerous citations, or this YouGov poll which suggests among the general British public the split is roughly even.

If a sound and valid argument was going to persuade objectors, it would have done so already. Therefore, although I will comment on the larger debate, my main intention is to invite objectors and proponents into conversation. I believe that there is an emotional core to the debate, which must be understood made explicit, if we are to gain anything useful out of it.

This first part of this essay focuses on (P1). Since it is more personal in scope, it's more greatly affected by subjectivity and thus the most likely to lead us to the emotional core. The next part will focus on (P2) which requires greater nuance to discuss.

Firstly, however, since I am going to try an engage with the emotional core of the opposition, it is only fair that I also lay out my own emotional core. If you're more interested in academic philosophy arguing for why immortality would be desirable, I rather like this essay by Corliss Lamont.

Why I Don't Want To Die

Life is short and there's lots to do

For as many experiences that you get to have, there are infinitely more you do not get to have. You have to continually make choices and reject life paths, sometimes permanently. If you dedicate 8 hours per day to practicing mathematics in your 20s, then you don't get to practice piano. If you read one book a week until the day you die, you still haven't read most books (nor even most good books).

Just as it's euphoric to become yourself and embrace the pleasures of life, it's agonising to think about what you might be missing. We come to terms with this, the same way we come to terms with any other tragedy. But what if this wasn't necessary? What if you could spend a lifetime becoming a musician, another focusing on activism, and another on raising a family? What if you wanted to get into game development at age 95 and that was fine because you still had eternity ahead of you? 

I love living.

You meet and talk to and sometimes kiss interesting people. You see an adorable dog on the train. You go on long walks in the woods, or watch the stars, or tell dirty jokes with your friends at a New Years party. You eat the best strawberry you've ever tasted. You fall in love and out of love over and over again. You cry because someone gave you a gift you've always wanted. You yearn and obtain and fail to obtain and yearn all the harder for it. 

You see hope win against the forces of evil. You see evil rise and somewhere you find within yourself the will to fight back, and push back, and bring back goodness to the world.

You condense all these experiences into art which you can share, and experience other people's lives through their art too. You cry at a beautiful line in a novel, or scream at a twist reveal in a movie. 

And then ... you wake up the next day and realise there's so much more life still in front of you, and you're so immensely grateful.

Transcendent experiences are rare and they're what I love for.

Once, just a few weeks before I got married, I was laying on my wife's lap as they sang to me. I felt as if all of Heaven had been condensed into that moment as their melody stitched together the parts of my soul I didn't even know were frayed.

Even though I want to live forever, and I think death is a tragedy, I feel as if my life has been worth it already because of that one moment. These kind of transcendent experiences are pretty rare and the longer you live the more you have.

Naturally, given these beliefs, I struggle to see why anyone wouldn't desire an immortal life. That said, I can appreciate there are certain risks to immortality that not everyone would be comfortable taking. What I truly thing is absurd is the suggestion that no-one would enjoy immortality, that it is fundamentally a bad thing for an individual to experience. That's kind of like saying no-one would enjoy vanilla ice-cream. 

In the interest of trying to piece apart the emotional core that desire, let's take a tour of the common arguments against the desirability immortality.

The arguments against the desirability of immortality

These arguments essentially have the same core problem: an immortal life would be overall so bad for you as an individual, whoever you are, and so (P1) is false.

Seeing loved ones die.

Argument: If you (and only you) get to live forever then you'd have to contend with an infinity of death.

Response: It isn't a necessary part of the premise that only you get to be immortal. Your friends could be too. And yes they might refuse, but if the only thing holding each of you back from living forever is that the others might not, then there isn't really anything holding you back. 

Also, even in our finite lives, we see loved ones die. I don't believe this makes a finite life not worth living, so why should it make an infinite life not worth living? Indeed, if your immortality means your loved ones never need to worry about you dying, isn't that perhaps a bonus?

If indeed we're arguing about a particular and unshareable immortality, I agree there would be a tinge of tragedy to that. I still think it would be worth it, if not only because in this case you have infinite time to try learn alternative routes to immortality.

Boredom/meaninglessness

Argument: Eventually, you'd run out of things that give you any joy and would spend eternity bored. Even if you did manage to merely entertain yourself, you'd then run out of meaningful things to do.

Response: This is one I really struggle to understand. Regarding pure boredom, there are infinitely many things to do (infinitely many books to read, for one).  Regarding meaninglessness - I have enough meaningful pursuits to last me several lifetimes, and I doubt that I would ever run out since new ideas are constantly emerging. Nevertheless, one could say that "I doubt" isn't really good enough when it comes to a choice with such potentially dire consequences. 

To those that are concerned that there are only finite reserves of meaning, I say do not worry. Spending time with friends is meaningful now and nothing would make it not meaningful. Making art and developing scientific ideas is meaningful now and forever. The universe and human mind together are a meaning producing engine.

What if you get stuck in a hole for 10^6 years and go mad?

Argument: An infinite life means that, with high probability, you'll eventually end up in a very bad situation for a very long time. 

Response: Firstly, the idea that given an infinite amount of time, everything will happen is a fallacy. I do accept that given an infinite amount of time it's overwhelmingly like that something terrible will happen. However, isn't it equally reasonable to say that an infinite life also entails  the certainly something very wonderful will happen? In that case, an immortal life is offers greater risks but also greater rewards.

I am personally willing to tolerate the risk. After all, even in my probably finite life, I'm not about to avoid all pleasure for the promise of safety. 

It is my personal opinion the rewards of life scale (at least) as fast as the risks as lifespan increases. However, I can definitely understand that others might see it differently. 

Heat death of the universe. 

Argument: Eventually the universe will be a cold-dead void and you'll be all alone. The suffering/boredom you experience over that final eternity nullifies any benefit you might experience up to that point.

Response: This is not really a pure argument against (P1). Given that the universe will experience heat death, an immortal life is unphysical and so impossible. Therefore we could take this argument as ma rejection of the idea that an immortal life is even conceptually coherent, rather than a rejection of its desirability. 

And to that I say ... sure. I mean, that's so far in the future that I have no idea what we'd be able to do by then. But I know that it would be a tragedy if all life was doomed to end.

A more fun response is to accept that apart from your immortality the universe is physically consistent. Do your finger nails still grow? Your hair? Does your microbiota reproduce and do you salivate? Are you still generating heat? Then as long as you live, the universe is not dead. You're a perpetual motion machine, baby, and moreover a font of hope. From you, new worlds will emerge.

Conclusion

After considering these arguments, I'd like to propose that the emotional core of objections to (P1) is pessimism. It's the belief that fundamentally life is unpleasant and the future is scary. 

There is, for sure, unpleasantness in life, and some people are given an unfair share. But to believe that given infinite time, one has no hope to recover is to believe in a universe that is not just unfair, not just uncaring, but truly cruel. Is this how you see the world? Am I close or way off the mark? If I am close, I'm sorry that you've suffered so much that it's made you give up. It seems all the crueler to me if life is both finite and unpleasant because it means those unpleasant years are something one can never get back. I hope, in the time you have left, that you can at least make up for them.

I acknowledge that I've probably suffered less than the average person, and that may well be the cause of my optimism which is naturally the emotional core of (P1). However, I'm not so sure; perhaps the seed of optimism was planted in my materially pleasant childhood but it blossomed in the moments when I was powerless, alone, and faced with an uncertain future. I wish only that I could propagate this feeling.

Things I keep thinking about

 I've posted a list of art that has stuck in my mind. I'm hoping to keep it updated.

You Can’t Escape Personhood: Thoughts on Andrew Joseph White’s You Weren’t Meant To Be Human

I loved White’s Hell Followed With Us, the only issue being that it was not an adult book. I wouldn’t even have read it if not for the fact it had aspects that I really cared for: queer characters, monstrous transformations, relationships between humans/non-humans. These aspects are shared with You Weren't Meant To Be Human, and it’s his debut adult novel, with adult protagonists and adult concerns. Naturally, I was beyond excited for the release.

Adding to that excitement was the fact that the description of the novel, at that time, concerned a protagonist who did not want to be human. The drive to escape humanity has been a function of my psyche since as far back as far as I can remember. As I child, I would

•       wear a cheap reaper cloak constantly, pretending I was death itself.
•      ask my relatives “what are you today” and be disappointed when they said “I’m me.” Did they not want to at least try to strive for something beyond humanity?
•      crawl on the ground, dart my tongue towards the ants crawling on the patio, in the hope that I would gain a deeper understanding of lizard psychology and eventually be able to live among them.

I don’t do those things anymore, but if given the chance I would not hesitate to transform into something monstrous. Something interesting and powerful and unconstrained by all the physical and societal constraints I’m subject to. 

I’m getting sad just thinking about impossible that is.

My hope for You Weren’t Meant to Be Human was initially that I would see this drive reflected in a protagonist. In the end, You Weren’t Mean To Be Human did not reflect this attitude either, but it is an excellent novel.

From here on, I’ll be spoiling the book.

For the novel’s protagonist, Crane, escaping humanity is a means to end his dysphoria. It would be, physically, easier to say something, get support in obtaining HRT from his friends or parents, but he’s so unable to make a decision that instead he wishes to be accidentally mutilated (accidentally, of course, because otherwise that would be making a choice). It’s an impulse that always leads to bad outcomes in the novel (such joining the hive in the first place, boiling his own face, moving in with Levi).

This is so different to what I think of when I imagine escaping humanity that I had difficulty understanding it. Synthesizing my emotional reaction to the novel’s symbols and my textual understanding of them is an ongoing struggle. It’s kind of like reading a language familiar enough to offer a sense of security while that same familiarity obscures its true meaning.

Consider the aliens themselves. These red, toothful, worms which writhe in ossified hives, devouring carrion, longing to see the day. That imagery goes hard. They’re creating something meaningful out of death, striving to move beyond their biological limitations to be in the sunlight. I wanted so much for them to be good.  Seeing Crane want to be part of that, my first response is “Of course, because they’re much better than humans.” But they ultimately turn out to be rather inert cult leaders, only able to control those who are unable to find their own will.

At one point, I thought the novel might be saying, “You have to accept that you are essentially human. There is no escape.” Crane might have been able to escape his assigned birth gender, but was the novel saying that, while one’s physical characteristics are mutable, one’s humanity is not? In fact, I realised that even this question is a reaction to feeling like my desire to escape humanity is being threatened.

I don’t think the novel says anything about humanity as a biological reality at all. Instead, it’s all about personhood.  

Crane doesn’t want to be human because he doesn’t want to be Sophie. He doesn’t like certain biological features and those would go away if he weren’t human at all. But more than that, Crane doesn’t want to be a person because a person has to make choices and take responsibility for those choices. He is very upfront about how he wants decisions to be made for him. It’s part of what drives him to the hive in the first place. Ironically, the other part is his own personal desires, to transition and to stop speaking, which are at odds with humanity’s expectations.

Since it “lets” him transition and stop speaking, he believes the hive is really where he belongs. He knows “the [human] world was not made for ones like you.” Yet his personhood finally drives him away from the hive too: when the hive allows him to get pregnant, it breaks that final boundary he’s held onto even when he discarded all the others. He realizes that the world is not made for him “but neither is the hive.”

The worms represent more or less than same thing has humanity (as a social existence, not a biological one)—a collective will that may at times conflict with one’s own personal desires. Crane is desperately unhappy in either case; this problem cannot be alleviated by simply replacing one collective will with another. What I ultimately take to be the message of this novel is that you can never escape your personhood. You will have boundaries and desires and needs whether you want them or not.

I’ll still be looking out for (and trying to write) a novel that resonates with my particular feelings towards escaping humanity, but You Weren’t Meant To Be Human came close in an interesting way. It’s a particularly torturous effect to see one’s own symbols of self-affirmation twisted into self-destruction.

Solipsism=0+

Quick update on this: currently querying this novel! But also looking to give out some ARCs in exchange for reviews in case I decided to self publish. Comment/email me at laynevanrens (at) gmail (dot) com/message me on Twitter or Bluesky.

Blurb: Zamuel is a burnt out, friendless, game developer who has recently quit their job after a break down at work. Since then, strange things have been occurring including edits to their game assets and the emergence of a pink cyst in their apartment ceiling. All this leads to a direct invitation giving specific instructions on how to enter Solipsism=0+, a world where desires manifest into physical forms known as Wills. There they fall in love with a jar, attempt to find a community that understands them, and struggle to avoid destruction at the neutralising force of The Balance.

quiz

Solipsism = Zero Plus

A novel I've been working on for over about two (maybe even three?) years is now close to being "finished". There are little details left to work out but the characters have taken on a life of their own and the themes have have solidified.

It's a good feeling.

The novel is called Solipsism = Zero Plus. It's a story about finding and/or creating a community and what happens when one cannot. In some ways, it's a deconstruction of portal fantasy, although it didn't start out that way.

The book is weird. The structure is playful, the characters are numerous and unusual, and the scope is broad. It touches a lot of different topics besides community, including, but not limited to: the struggle to make art, plurality, unconventional relationships, riddles, and the existential horror of advertisements. 

I'd like to get it published traditionally if possible. If I cannot accomplish this, it will certainly be self published eventually.